Bargaining with Ordinal and Cardinal Players: The Cardinal Concession Rule

E. Calvo*, H.J.M. Peters

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


We consider bargaining problems with at least one cardinal player and with ordinal players, and provide a complete description of utility invariant solutions of such problems for two players. For the n-person case we provide a procedure that: (i) returns a given cardinal solution if there are only cardinal players; (ii) is based on the ordinal solution for gradual bargaining problems, introduced by o'neill et al. [o'neill, b., samet, d., wiener, z., winter, e., 2002. Bargaining with an agenda. Games econ. Behav., in press], for the ordinal players. Finally, we introduce the so-called cardinal concession solution as another example of a utility invariant solution.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)20-33
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2005


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