Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims

M.J. Albizuri, Bas Dietzenbacher*, J.M. Zarzuelo

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies independence of higher claims and independence of irrelevant claims on the domain of bargaining problems with claims. Independence of higher claims requires that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the higher claim of another agent. Independence of irrelevant claims states that the payoffs should not change when the claims decrease but remain higher than the payoffs. Interestingly, in conjunction with standard axioms from bargaining theory, these properties characterize a new constrained Nash solution, a constrained Kalai–Smorodinsky solution, and a constrained Kalai solution.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)11-17
Number of pages7
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume91
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2020

Keywords

  • bargaining with claims
  • independence of higher claims
  • independence of irrelevant claims
  • constrained Nash solution
  • constrained Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
  • constrained Kalai solution

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