Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

I. Bozbay; F.K. Dietrich; H.J.M. Peters

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.007

Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

I. Bozbay, F.K. Dietrich, H.J.M. Peters^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Quantitative Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

6 Citations (Web of Science)

Abstract

Following vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome: the disagreement outcome may serve as a reference point for the compromise outcome, but other interpretations are given as well. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical kalai–smorodinsky bargaining solution. We identify the (large) domain on which this solution is single-valued, and present two axiomatic characterizations on subsets of this domain.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	407-417
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	74
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.007
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2012

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10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.007

Cite this

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