We give an account of an overlapping-generations experiment with multiple families in which voluntary transfers can take the form of support to the elderly or grants to children. Support to the old is a purely intergenerational (intra-family) transfer, whereas grants to children also involve an element of intra-generational (inter-family) redistribution through a compulsory pension system. Our data show that higher compulsory inter-family transfers lead subjects to place relatively more emphasis on support instead of grants: grants are crowded out, but support is not significantly affected. The efficiency of voluntary transfers increases, however. Furthermore, if subjects give transfers, they do not use tokens of direct reciprocity; evidence of indirect reciprocity in transfer behavior can only be obtained for the case where compulsory transfers are high.
Güth, W., Offerman, T., Potters, J. A. M., Strobel, M., & Verbon, H. A. A. (2002). Are Family Transfers Crowded Out by Public Tranfers? Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104(4), 587-604. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00303