Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences

M. Vorsatz

doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0149-4

Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences

M. Vorsatz^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of approval voting when individuals have dichotomous preferences. We show that a social choice function is anonymous, neutral, strategy-proof and strictly monotone if and only if it is approval voting and interpret this result as an extension of may’s theorem (econometrica 20:680–684, 1952). Then, we show that approval voting is the only strictly symmetric, neutral and efficient social choice function. This result is related to a characterization of baigent and xu (math soc sci 21:21–29, 1991).

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	127-141
Number of pages	14
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	28
Issue number	2007
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0149-4
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2007

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AB - The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of approval voting when individuals have dichotomous preferences. We show that a social choice function is anonymous, neutral, strategy-proof and strictly monotone if and only if it is approval voting and interpret this result as an extension of may’s theorem (econometrica 20:680–684, 1952). Then, we show that approval voting is the only strictly symmetric, neutral and efficient social choice function. This result is related to a characterization of baigent and xu (math soc sci 21:21–29, 1991).

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JO - Social Choice and Welfare

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Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences

Abstract

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