Abstract
The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of approval voting when individuals have dichotomous preferences. We show that a social choice function is anonymous, neutral, strategy-proof and strictly monotone if and only if it is approval voting and interpret this result as an extension of may’s theorem (econometrica 20:680–684, 1952). Then, we show that approval voting is the only strictly symmetric, neutral and efficient social choice function. This result is related to a characterization of baigent and xu (math soc sci 21:21–29, 1991).
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 127-141 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue number | 2007 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2007 |