Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences

M. Vorsatz*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

17 Citations (Web of Science)


The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of approval voting when individuals have dichotomous preferences. We show that a social choice function is anonymous, neutral, strategy-proof and strictly monotone if and only if it is approval voting and interpret this result as an extension of may’s theorem (econometrica 20:680–684, 1952). Then, we show that approval voting is the only strictly symmetric, neutral and efficient social choice function. This result is related to a characterization of baigent and xu (math soc sci 21:21–29, 1991).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)127-141
Number of pages14
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number2007
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2007

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