Abstract
Several attempts have been made to give an objective definition of subjective probability. These attempts can be divided into two approaches. The first approach uses an a priori probability distribution over the set of interpretations of the language that we are using to describe information. The idea is to define such an a priori probability distribution using some general principles such as the insufficient reason principle of Bemoulli and Laplace.The second approach does not start from a set of interpretations among which we try to find the one describing the world, but instead tries to build a partial model of the world. Uncertainty in the available information results in several possible partial models, each presenting a different view of the world. Using the insufficient reason principle, a probability is assigned to each view.This paper will present arguments for using the second approach instead of the first. Furthermore, a new formalization of the second approach, solving the problems of earlier attempts, will be given.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | 13TH European Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
Publisher | John Wiley & Sons Inc. |
Pages | 595-599 |
Number of pages | 5 |
ISBN (Print) | 0-471-98431-0 |
Publication status | Published - 1998 |