An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment

F. Mengel, V. Grimm

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study how players learn to make decisions if they face many different games. Games are drawn randomly from a set of either two or six games in each of 100 rounds. If either there are few games or if extensive summary information is provided (or both) convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium generally occurs. Otherwise this is not the case. We demonstrate that there are learning spillovers across games but participants learn to play strategically equivalent games in the same way. Our design and analysis allow us to distinguish between different sources of complexity and theoretical models of categorization. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2220-2259
Number of pages40
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume147
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2012

Keywords

  • Game theory
  • Learning
  • Multiple games
  • Experiments
  • DECISION-MAKING
  • PLAY
  • EQUILIBRIUM
  • INFORMATION
  • CAPACITY
  • BEHAVIOR

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