An empirical analysis of the role of risk aversion in executive compensation contracts

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Original language	English
Place of Publication	Maastricht
Publisher	METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.26481/umamet.2000045
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2000

Series	METEOR Research Memorandum
Number	045

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