An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule

Burak Can; Mohsen Pourpouneh; Ton Storcken

doi:10.1007/s10058-021-00259-2

An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule

Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh^*, Ton Storcken

^*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

The Kemeny rule is one of the well studied decision rules. In this paper we show that the Kemeny rule is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, strongly tie-breaking, strongly gradual, and weighed tournamental. We show that these conditions are logically independent.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	447-467
Number of pages	21
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	26
Issue number	3
Early online date	14 Aug 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00259-2
Publication status	Published - Sept 2022

JEL classifications

d70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"
d72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Keywords

Kemeny rule
Preference aggregation
Axiomatic characterization

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10.1007/s10058-021-00259-2

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An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule

Abstract

JEL classifications

Keywords

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