An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule

Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh*, Ton Storcken

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

The Kemeny rule is one of the well studied decision rules. In this paper we show that the Kemeny rule is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, strongly tie-breaking, strongly gradual, and weighed tournamental. We show that these conditions are logically independent.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages21
JournalReview of Economic Design
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 14 Aug 2021

JEL classifications

  • d70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
  • d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"
  • d72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Keywords

  • Kemeny rule
  • Preference aggregation
  • Axiomatic characterization

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