Abstract
A combinatorial auction is an auction where multiple items are for sale simultaneously to a set of buyers. Furthermore, buyers are allowed to place bids on subsets of the available items. This paper focuses on a combinatorial auction where a bidder can express his preferences by means of a so-called ordered matrix bid. Ordered matrix bids are a bidding language that allows a compact representation of a bidder's preferences and was developed by Day [Day, R. W. 2004. Expressing preferences with price-vector agents in combinatorial auctions. Ph.D. thesis, University of Maryland, College Park]. We give an overview of how a combinatorial auction with matrix bids works. We discuss the relevance of recognizing whether a given matrix bid has properties related to elements of economic theory such as free disposal, subadditivity, submodularity, and the gross substitutes property. We show that verifying whether a matrix bid has these properties can be done in polynomial time by solving one or more shortest-path problems. Finally, we investigate to what extent randomly generated matrix bids satisfy these properties.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 339-352 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Informs Journal on Computing |
Volume | 22 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2010 |
Keywords
- combinatorial auction
- matrix bids
- free disposal
- subadditivity
- submodularity
- gross substitutes
- expressiveness
- GROSS SUBSTITUTES
- TRANSPORTATION SERVICES
- WINNER DETERMINATION
- EQUILIBRIUM
- PROCUREMENT
- INDIVISIBILITIES