Abstract
In this note, we extend Aumann’s agreement theorem to a framework where beliefs are modelled by conditional probability systems à la Battigalli, P., and M. Siniscalchi. 1999. “Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games. ”Journal of Economic Theory 88: 188–230. We prove two independent generalizations of the agreement theorem, one where the agents share some common conditioning event, and one where they may not.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 20160182 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | B E Journal of Theoretical Economics |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jul 2018 |
| Event | 12th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT) - Maastricht University, Maastricht, Netherlands Duration: 20 Jul 2016 → 22 Jul 2016 |
Keywords
- Agreement
- posterior beliefs
- conditional probability systems
- conditioning events
- COMMON PRIOR ASSUMPTION
- INFORMATION
- HIERARCHIES
- BELIEF
- GAMES