Aggregate information, common knowledge and agreeing not to bet

E. Tsakas

doi:10.1007/s00182-010-0226-x

Aggregate information, common knowledge and agreeing not to bet

E. Tsakas^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

This note considers gambles that take place even if only some-but not all-individuals agree to participate. I show that the bet cannot take place if it is commonly known how many individuals are willing to participate.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	111-117
Number of pages	7
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	40
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0226-x
Publication status	Published - Feb 2011

Keywords

Gambles
Limited participation
Common knowledge
DISAGREE

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10.1007/s00182-010-0226-xLicence: CC BY-NC

Cite this

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title = "Aggregate information, common knowledge and agreeing not to bet",

abstract = "This note considers gambles that take place even if only some-but not all-individuals agree to participate. I show that the bet cannot take place if it is commonly known how many individuals are willing to participate.",

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KW - Common knowledge

KW - DISAGREE

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Aggregate information, common knowledge and agreeing not to bet

Abstract

Keywords

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