Persuading communicating voters

Toygar Kerman, Anastas P. Tenev

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference article in proceedingAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with receivers who have homogeneous beliefs and aligned preferences. The sender wants to implement a proposal and commits to a communication strategy which sends private (possibly) correlated messages to the receivers, who are in an exogenous and commonly known network. Receivers can observe their neighbors' private messages and after updating their beliefs, vote sincerely on the proposal. We examine how networks of shared information affect the sender's gain from persuasion and find that in many cases it is not restricted by the additional information provided by the receivers' neighborhoods. Perhaps surprisingly, the sender's gain from persuasion is not monotonically decreasing with the density of the network.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings Eighteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
EditorsJoseph Halpern, Andrés Perea
Pages231
Volume335
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 22 Jun 2021
Event18th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge - Beijing, China
Duration: 25 Jun 202127 Jun 2021
Conference number: 18

Publication series

SeriesElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
ISSN2075-2180

Conference

Conference18th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Abbreviated titleTARK 2021
Country/TerritoryChina
CityBeijing
Period25/06/2127/06/21

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