A theory of sequential reciprocity

M. Dufwenberg, G. Kirchsteiger*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

    744 Citations (Web of Science)


    Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept—sequential reciprocity equilibrium—for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)268-298
    Number of pages30
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2004

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