A strategic approach to multiple estate division problems

D.G. Palvolgyi, H.J.M. Peters, A.J. Vermeulen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

The classical bankruptcy problem is extended by assuming that there are multiple estates. In the finite estate case, the agents have homogeneous preferences per estate, which may differ across estates. In the more general infinite estate problem, players have arbitrary preferences over an interval of real numbers each of which is regarded as an estate. A strategic estate game is formulated in which each agent distributes his legal entitlement over the estates, resulting in individual claims per estate: each estate is then divided according to some allocation rule. The paper focuses on existence and on computational aspects of Nash equilibria in finite and infinite estate games, with some focus on the proportional allocation rule. For this rule, it also studies Pareto optimality and envy-freeness of equilibrium allocations. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)135-152
Number of pages18
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume88
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2014

Keywords

  • Bankruptcy problem
  • Multiple estate division
  • Non-cooperative estate division game
  • EXISTENCE
  • TALMUD
  • GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
  • BANKRUPTCY
  • LAND

Cite this

@article{128feb21aef5490fab44ea9187b22375,
title = "A strategic approach to multiple estate division problems",
abstract = "The classical bankruptcy problem is extended by assuming that there are multiple estates. In the finite estate case, the agents have homogeneous preferences per estate, which may differ across estates. In the more general infinite estate problem, players have arbitrary preferences over an interval of real numbers each of which is regarded as an estate. A strategic estate game is formulated in which each agent distributes his legal entitlement over the estates, resulting in individual claims per estate: each estate is then divided according to some allocation rule. The paper focuses on existence and on computational aspects of Nash equilibria in finite and infinite estate games, with some focus on the proportional allocation rule. For this rule, it also studies Pareto optimality and envy-freeness of equilibrium allocations. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.",
keywords = "Bankruptcy problem, Multiple estate division, Non-cooperative estate division game, EXISTENCE, TALMUD, GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS, BANKRUPTCY, LAND",
author = "D.G. Palvolgyi and H.J.M. Peters and A.J. Vermeulen",
year = "2014",
month = "11",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.005",
language = "English",
volume = "88",
pages = "135--152",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Elsevier Science",

}

A strategic approach to multiple estate division problems. / Palvolgyi, D.G.; Peters, H.J.M.; Vermeulen, A.J.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 88, 11.2014, p. 135-152.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - A strategic approach to multiple estate division problems

AU - Palvolgyi, D.G.

AU - Peters, H.J.M.

AU - Vermeulen, A.J.

PY - 2014/11

Y1 - 2014/11

N2 - The classical bankruptcy problem is extended by assuming that there are multiple estates. In the finite estate case, the agents have homogeneous preferences per estate, which may differ across estates. In the more general infinite estate problem, players have arbitrary preferences over an interval of real numbers each of which is regarded as an estate. A strategic estate game is formulated in which each agent distributes his legal entitlement over the estates, resulting in individual claims per estate: each estate is then divided according to some allocation rule. The paper focuses on existence and on computational aspects of Nash equilibria in finite and infinite estate games, with some focus on the proportional allocation rule. For this rule, it also studies Pareto optimality and envy-freeness of equilibrium allocations. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

AB - The classical bankruptcy problem is extended by assuming that there are multiple estates. In the finite estate case, the agents have homogeneous preferences per estate, which may differ across estates. In the more general infinite estate problem, players have arbitrary preferences over an interval of real numbers each of which is regarded as an estate. A strategic estate game is formulated in which each agent distributes his legal entitlement over the estates, resulting in individual claims per estate: each estate is then divided according to some allocation rule. The paper focuses on existence and on computational aspects of Nash equilibria in finite and infinite estate games, with some focus on the proportional allocation rule. For this rule, it also studies Pareto optimality and envy-freeness of equilibrium allocations. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

KW - Bankruptcy problem

KW - Multiple estate division

KW - Non-cooperative estate division game

KW - EXISTENCE

KW - TALMUD

KW - GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS

KW - BANKRUPTCY

KW - LAND

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.005

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.005

M3 - Article

VL - 88

SP - 135

EP - 152

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -