Abstract
Squeezes are registered in the forward market for brent crude oil. The squeezer accumulates forward contracts and creates artificial demand. This causes the price to surge and introduces uncertainty about the market outcome. Squeezes therefore render the market institution less palatable to other market participants. Producers may have a long term interest in keeping market clearing smooth, e.g. By supplying stocks to squeezed traders. The extent to which such self-regulation should be carried out is analysed in the context of a repeated game. Unless the probability of a squeeze is very small, self-regulation should be possible.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 104-112 |
Journal | The Economic Journal |
Volume | 107 |
Issue number | 440 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jan 1997 |
Externally published | Yes |