Abstract
We consider situations where the cooperation and negotiation possibilities between pairs of agents are given by an undirected graph. Every connected component of agents has a value, which is the total surplus the agents can generate by working together. We present a simple, sequential, bilateral bargaining procedure, in which at every stage the two agents in a link, (i,j) bargain about their share from cooperation in the connected component they are part of. We show that this procedure yields the Myerson value (Myerson, 1997) if the marginal value of any link in a connected component is increasing in the number of links in that connected component.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 131-150 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics |
Volume | 13 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 1 May 2013 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2013 |
Keywords
- Myerson value
- networks
- bargaining
- cooperation
- LINK FORMATION
- SURPLUS
- GAMES
- IMPLEMENTATION
- NETWORKS
- MODEL