A Relation between Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria

R.J.A.P. Peeters; R.L.P. Hendrickx; J.A.M. Potters

doi:10.1142/S021919890200077X

A Relation between Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria

R.J.A.P. Peeters, R.L.P. Hendrickx, J.A.M. Potters

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

314 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the set of correlated equilibria of bimatrix games. These equilibria are interesting, because they can result in outcome profiles that are not feasible as a result of Nash equilibria. After giving an example to illustrate the various concepts, we present a Projection Theorem which relates the two types of equilibria. Some lemmas are provided to clarify and extend this theorem.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	405-414
Journal	International Game Theory Review
Volume	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1142/S021919890200077X
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2002

Access to Document

10.1142/S021919890200077X

Full TextFinal published version, 193 KB

Cite this

@article{6de2ae2f85cc448cb257ee21dde7915e,

title = "A Relation between Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria",

abstract = "In this paper we investigate the set of correlated equilibria of bimatrix games. These equilibria are interesting, because they can result in outcome profiles that are not feasible as a result of Nash equilibria. After giving an example to illustrate the various concepts, we present a Projection Theorem which relates the two types of equilibria. Some lemmas are provided to clarify and extend this theorem.",

author = "R.J.A.P. Peeters and R.L.P. Hendrickx and J.A.M. Potters",

year = "2002",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1142/S021919890200077X",

language = "English",

volume = "4",

pages = "405--414",

journal = "International Game Theory Review",

issn = "0219-1989",

publisher = "World Scientific Publishing Company",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Relation between Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria

AU - Peeters, R.J.A.P.

AU - Hendrickx, R.L.P.

AU - Potters, J.A.M.

PY - 2002/1/1

Y1 - 2002/1/1

N2 - In this paper we investigate the set of correlated equilibria of bimatrix games. These equilibria are interesting, because they can result in outcome profiles that are not feasible as a result of Nash equilibria. After giving an example to illustrate the various concepts, we present a Projection Theorem which relates the two types of equilibria. Some lemmas are provided to clarify and extend this theorem.

AB - In this paper we investigate the set of correlated equilibria of bimatrix games. These equilibria are interesting, because they can result in outcome profiles that are not feasible as a result of Nash equilibria. After giving an example to illustrate the various concepts, we present a Projection Theorem which relates the two types of equilibria. Some lemmas are provided to clarify and extend this theorem.

U2 - 10.1142/S021919890200077X

DO - 10.1142/S021919890200077X

M3 - Article

SN - 0219-1989

VL - 4

SP - 405

EP - 414

JO - International Game Theory Review

JF - International Game Theory Review

ER -