A Relation between Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria

R.J.A.P. Peeters, R.L.P. Hendrickx, J.A.M. Potters

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate the set of correlated equilibria of bimatrix games. These equilibria are interesting, because they can result in outcome profiles that are not feasible as a result of Nash equilibria. After giving an example to illustrate the various concepts, we present a Projection Theorem which relates the two types of equilibria. Some lemmas are provided to clarify and extend this theorem.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)405-414
JournalInternational Game Theory Review
Volume4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2002

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