A procedural egalitarian solution for NTU-games

Bas Dietzenbacher*, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper introduces and analyzes a procedural egalitarian solution for nontransferable utility games. This concept is based on an egalitarian procedure in which egalitarian opportunities of coalitions are explicitly taken into account. We formulate conditions under which the new solution prescribes a core element and derive a direct expression on the class of bargaining games and the class of bankruptcy games.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)20-27
Number of pages8
JournalDiscrete Applied Mathematics
Volume283
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 15 Sep 2020

Keywords

  • NTU-games
  • egalitarianism
  • procedural egalitarian solution
  • egalitarian procedure
  • egalitarian stability
  • constrained relative equal awards rule

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