A note on cartel ringleaders and the corporate leniency programme

I. Bos, F. Wandschneider

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Cartel ringleaders can apply for amnesty in some jurisdictions (e.g., the EU), whereas in others they are excluded (e.g., the US). This note shows that ringleader exclusion loosens the incentive constraint of regular cartel members and tightens or loosens the incentive constraint of ringleaders. The latter may occur when the first firm that applies for leniency receives a sufficiently high discount.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1100-1103
JournalApplied Economics Letters
Volume20
Issue number11
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2013

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