A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation.

F.K. Dietrich, C. List

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

In the emerging literature on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. A group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups with expert knowledge on, or particularly affected by, certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions. We identify a problem that generalizes sen’s ‘liberal paradox’. Under plausible conditions, the assignment of rights to two or more individuals or subgroups is inconsistent with the unanimity principle, whereby unanimously accepted propositions are collectively accepted. The inconsistency can be avoided if individual judgments or rights satisfy special conditions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)59-78
Number of pages20
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume31
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2008

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