A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions

Dominik Karos*, Nozomu Muto, Shiran Rachmilevitch

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


We characterize the class of weakly efficient n-person bargaining solutions that solely depend on the ratios of the players' ideal payoffs. In the case of at least three players the ratio between the solution payoffs of any two players is a power of the ratio between their ideal payoffs. As special cases this class contains the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, which can be pinned down by imposing additional axioms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1169-1182
Number of pages14
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number4
Early online date22 Jan 2018
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2018

JEL classifications

  • c71 - Cooperative Games
  • c78 - "Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory"


  • Bargaining
  • Efficiency-free characterizations
  • Parametrized solutions
  • C78
  • C71
  • NASH

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