Abstract
We characterize the class of weakly efficient n-person bargaining solutions that solely depend on the ratios of the players' ideal payoffs. In the case of at least three players the ratio between the solution payoffs of any two players is a power of the ratio between their ideal payoffs. As special cases this class contains the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, which can be pinned down by imposing additional axioms.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1169-1182 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
Volume | 47 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 22 Jan 2018 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2018 |
JEL classifications
- c71 - Cooperative Games
- c78 - "Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory"
Keywords
- Bargaining
- Efficiency-free characterizations
- Parametrized solutions
- C78
- C71
- NASH