A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction

M. Lombardi; N. Yoshihara

doi:10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2

A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction

M. Lombardi
, N. Yoshihara^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Quantitative Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo's message space specification--mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving 'one less' preference announcements breaks this equivalence relationship down.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	131-151
Number of pages	21
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	54
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2
Publication status	Published - Sept 2013

Keywords

Nash implementation
Strategy space reduction
s-mechanisms
SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
EQUILIBRIUM
INFORMATION
CORRESPONDENCES
ALLOCATIONS
MECHANISMS
ECONOMIES
AMBIGUITY

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10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2

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abstract = "The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo's message space specification--mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving 'one less' preference announcements breaks this equivalence relationship down.",

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KW - INFORMATION

KW - CORRESPONDENCES

KW - ALLOCATIONS

KW - MECHANISMS

KW - ECONOMIES

KW - AMBIGUITY

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JO - Economic Theory

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A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction

Abstract

Keywords

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