A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction

M. Lombardi, N. Yoshihara

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo's message space specification--mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving 'one less' preference announcements breaks this equivalence relationship down.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)131-151
Number of pages21
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume54
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2013

Keywords

  • Nash implementation
  • Strategy space reduction
  • s-mechanisms
  • SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
  • EQUILIBRIUM
  • INFORMATION
  • CORRESPONDENCES
  • ALLOCATIONS
  • MECHANISMS
  • ECONOMIES
  • AMBIGUITY

Cite this