Abstract
We study the endogenous formation of cartels from a dynamic point of view. First, we review some stability analyses from existing literature, which usually predict a rather small cartel as the outcome. We then study a dynamic model, in which firms can freely leave the cartel if they wish, and firms can enter the cartel if both the cartel and the firm so desire. We show that the dynamic process converges to a strongly stable cartel if one exists. Otherwise, the process does not converge, but during the process the cartel-size will never go below any size predicted by a stability analysis.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 397-408 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
Volume | 37 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2008 |
Keywords
- Group decisions
- Firm organization
- Market structure
- Static versus dynamic
- PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA
- STABLE CARTELS
- EXTERNALITIES
- COALITIONS