A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting

Souvik Roy*, Ton Storcken

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Web of Science)

Abstract

We consider domains in strategic voting problems which satisfy three properties, namely top-connectedness, pervasiveness, and richness. We prove the following two results for such a domain: (i) it admits non-dictatorial, unanimous, and strategy-proof choice functions if and only if it has an inseparable top-pair, and (ii) it admits anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof choice functions only if it does not have any top-circuit. Finally, we establish the practical relevance of our results by applying them in the context of locating a public good or a public bad, preference aggregations, policy making, etc.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)46-55
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume84
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2019

Keywords

  • Top-connectedness
  • Dictatorial domains
  • Euclidean preferences
  • SOCIAL-WELFARE FUNCTIONS
  • PROOFNESS
  • CHOICE

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