DescriptionThis presentation examines whether tying by statutory dominant firms should be subject to a differentiated (stricter) scrutiny compared with economic monopolies that are not legally protected. It answers this question, by firstly examining the differences between the economic effects of tying by statutory dominant firms and tying by other dominant firms. It finds that because of the privileged advantages enjoyed by statutory dominant firms, tying by this kind of firms may generate significant anti-competitive effects, which are likely to outweigh possible pro-competitive effects. It also examines competition practice in China and the EU, finding that during the economic reform process of historically state-controlled industries, tying by statutory dominant firms has frequently taken place, generating the leveraging effects and upsetting liberalized and competitive tied markets. Considering the above economic insights and competition practice, it proposes potential ways for strengthening competition law scrutiny of tying by statutory dominant firms, to reduce error mistakes and enhance the effectiveness of competition law scrutiny.
|Period||8 Apr 2022|
|Event title||Competition Law and Policy: Recent Developments in China and the EU|
|Location||Maastricht, NetherlandsShow on map|
|Degree of Recognition||International|